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A comparison of time preference functional forms: Evidence from a field 
experiment 
 
Abstract: A comprehensive understanding of individual-level discounting behaviours is crucial 
because of its implications for designing financial incentive interventions encouraging health 
behaviors. This paper estimates mixture models to determine probabilistically the discounting 
functional form which has the best fit to discounting behaviours, on the basis of a series of 
incentive-compatible time and risk preference field experiments conducted among 176 civil 
servants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Time preference was structurally estimated while 
controlling for risk preference, background consumption, and probability weighting. The results 
suggested that future monetary incentives were discounted hyperbolically rather than 
exponentially and that a generalised hyperbolic form had the best fit among a series of 
alternative functional forms. Our results also showed that the failure to adopt an appropriate 
type of functional form led to significantly different discount rates and misleading associations 
between time preference and real-world behaviours such as smoking. Identifying the best-fit 
discounting functional form may be a useful tool to improve the effectiveness of financial 
incentive interventions such that more immediate rewards should be provided to the target 
population with a higher degree of time-inconsistency. 
 
Keywords: Hyperbolic discounting; Time preference; Risk preference; Mixture models; 
Smoking 
 
JEL classification: C93 D90 I12 
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1 Introduction 
People often face choices in which they must trade-off an immediate, smaller versus a later, 
higher gratification. Psychologists and behavioural economists have discovered that humans 
tend to devalue a delayed reward so that the subjective value is higher for an immediate reward 
of the same nominal amount (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Kirby & 
Marakovic, 1996). This trait is denoted as time preference, which is also known as delay 
discounting or temporal discounting. The extent to which future reward is discounted is 
represented by the discount rate. There is a rich literature on the association between discount 
rates and various impulsive unhealthy behaviours (Courtemanche, Heutel, & McAlvanah, 2015; 
Harrison, Lau, & Rutstrom, 2010; Ikeda, Kang, & Ohtake, 2010; Kang & Ikeda, 2014; 
MacKillop et al., 2011; Reynolds, 2006; Richards & Hamilton, 2012; Story, Vlaev, Seymour, 
Darzi, & Dolan, 2014). Since policy makers are paying increasing attention to the use of 
financial incentives in behavioural change programs, for example, to encourage smoking 
cessation (Volpp et al., 2008) and physical activity (Patel et al., 2016), a better understanding 
of how financial incentives are discounted would be useful to shed light on the type of 
incentivised programmes that might be most valuable for encouraging health behaviours in 
specific population groups. Tailoring these interventions based on the nature of time 
preferences has the potential to improve their effectiveness, especially in cases where financial 
incentives are awarded in the future after health targets are achieved e.g. commitment contracts 
(Loewenstein, Asch, Friedman, Melichar, & Volpp, 2012). 
It is becoming increasingly popular among health economists to elicit time preferences 
(discount rates) by conducting field experiments composed of a series of incentive-compatible 
real-stake choices tasks (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutstrom, 2008, 2014; Andreoni, Kuhn, 
& Sprenger, 2015; Freeman, Manzini, Mariotti, & Mittone, 2016)1. To represent how future 
                                               
1 An alternative method to measure time preference is by asking participants to imagine a hypothetical illness and 
to choose between immediate over delayed occurrence of the illness (Van der Pol & Cairns, 2011). However, after 
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rewards are evaluated and discounted, a functional form for discounting must be assumed. 
However, there is no consensus on which parametric form most accurately characterises 
discounting behaviours. First, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from previous literature 
on whether future incentives are discounted to their present values exponentially or 
hyperbolically in incentive-compatible environments. For instance, Harrison and Lau (2005) 
argued that hyperbolic discounting is an “experimental artefact” because a majority of 
experiments fail to control for credibility of future payments so that subjects always choose the 
immediate payments, causing hyperbolical intertemporal preferences. Kirby and Santiesteban 
(2003) asserted that any affirmation of hyperbolic discounting is confounded when a concave 
utility function is assumed to be linear. When a front-end delay (FED) is imposed to ensure 
equal credibility of sooner and later payments and risk preference is controlled to account for 
concavity of the utility function, Andersen et al. (2008) found that 93% of observations reflected 
exponential discounting while hyperbolic discounting accounted for only 7%. Further, 
Andersen et al. (2014) again found no support for hyperbolic discounting in a sample of 413 
Danish adults. A similar finding was reported by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) for a group of 
249 American undergraduate students. Conversely, Harrison, Hofmeyr, Ross, and Swarthout 
(2017) observed hyperbolic discounting in a group of 175 South African students using similar 
methods 2 . Because of these contradictory findings, more evidence is needed before any 
conclusions can be reached. Secondly, little insight exists into which candidate functional form 
most accurately describes intertemporal preferences. Researchers have frequently made 
arbitrary choices as to the discounting functional form when analysing behavioural data by 
assuming exponential discounting (Booij & van Praag, 2009; Coller, Harrison, & Rutstrom, 
2012), Mazur hyperbolic discounting (Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, 2008; 
                                               
reviewing the time preference studies that have used hypothetical health, Story et al. (2014) argued that the time 
preference elicited by this method suffer from hypothetical bias and thus not recommended. 
2  In a non-monetary context, McDonald et al. (2017) observed non-exponential discounting for students’ 
intertemporal choices involving mortality risks. 
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Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005), or Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Burks, Carpenter, Gotte, & 
Rustichini, 2012; Courtemanche et al., 2015; Ida, 2014; Salanie & Treich, 2006). As argued by 
Luhmann (2013), it is crucial to distinguish among different types of hyperbolic discounting 
because the widely used hyperbolic specifications in psychological studies, such as the Mazur 
specification, do not necessarily characterise discounting behaviours. Even the Quasi-
hyperbolic model prominent among economists did not capture intertemporal preferences 
(Abdellaoui, Attema, & Bleichrodt, 2010).  
A number of studies have attemped to discriminate among discounting funtional forms. Proxy 
measures were constructed to indicate hyperbolic discounting if the relative discount rate 
between two proximal dates is higher than the relative discount rate between two distal dates 
with the same length of delay (Ikeda et al., 2010; Kang & Ikeda, 2014). This parsimonious 
dummy indicator approach is limited because it does not quantify the magnitude of the 
hyperbolic discount rate. Other studies were limited to comparing model-fit assessed by the 
sum of squared errors (Abdellaoui et al., 2010; McKerchar et al., 2009; Ohmura, Takahashi, & 
Kitamura, 2005; Richards & Hamilton, 2012; Stillwell & Tunney, 2012) or by the Akaike 
Information Criterion (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & l'Haridon, 2013). Cavagnaro, Aranovich, 
McClure, Pitt, and Myung (2016) used a simulation method based on laboratory experiment 
data but did not control for risk preference which leads to upward-biased discount rate estimates 
as put forward by Andersen et al. (2008). In our paper, we probabistically discriminate among 
alternative discounting functions by mixture models based on a series of economic experiments 
which: (i) use real payments; (ii) control for credibility of future payment by imposing a front-
end delay, (iii) control for concavity of the utility function; and (iv) control for background 
information and probability weighting.  
The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we establish the usefulness of a mixture 
model, and indeed fully exploit its potential by controlling for elements such as risk preference, 
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background consumption and probability weighting which are often ignored in the literature 
but may affect estimation of discount rates. Second, our study is among the first to show that 
the failure to adopt an appropriate type of functional form can lead to significantly different 
discount rates and misleading associations between time preference and real-world behaviours 
such as smoking. The third merit is that the field experiments were conducted on a unique 
population-based sample with real payments, offering more credibility for the validity of our 
results. In the study to be reported here, we are able to establish the nature of discounting 
behaviour in the sample from the data itself. A majority of economic experiments studies were 
conducted with university students who are easily accessible but may limit the value in 
informing public health policies. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and Section 
3 shows the methodology and estimation framework. Section 4 describes the sample and dataset. 
Section 5 presents empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Experimental design 
We apply the multiple price lists (MPL) design in which participants were presented with a 
table with ten ordered dichotomous choices (one per row) and asked to indicate one answer for 
each row. Coller and Williams (1999) were the pioneers of MPL to elicit discount rates, which 
were then popularized by Holt and Laury (2002) and Andersen et al. (2008, 2014). A landmark 
paper in the discount rate elicitation literature is Andersen et al. (2008) who demonstrated that 
discount rate MPL should be “corrected” by considering parallel risk preference tasks in order 
to avoid upward-biased discount rate estimates. In light of this, in our design, participants were 
presented with both time preference and risk preference MPLs.  
2.1 Time preference MPLs 
Each time preference MPL had 10 choice tasks, each of which had two outcomes: a smaller 
immediate reward (Option A; £250) and a larger future reward which varied according to the 
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length of the time horizon (Option B) (see Appendix Table 1 for an example). The future reward 
for the first choice task was obtained by incrementing the principal (£2503) by an annual rate 
of 5%, which increases by the conventional 5% as it progresses to the next choice task, reaching 
50% for the last (10th) choice task. The information on annual effective interest rates was shown 
on the MPLs. A multiple-horizon treatment was used and these were randomly drawn from the 
six time horizons: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 months. The three chosen time horizons (in a random 
order) were presented with a one-month FED (Front End Delay4) and non-FED, respectively, 
leading to six MPLs for each participant. Before proceeding to the formal MPLs, the 
participants were asked to practice an example MPL. A participant was expected to choose 
Option A for the first several choices and switch to Option B at some point. The switching point 
determines the participant’s discount rate. For instance, if a participant chooses Option A, say, 
for the first four tasks (corresponding to a discount rate of 20%) and Option B from the fifth 
and subsequent tasks (corresponding to a discount rate of 25%), it can be inferred that the 
individual discount rate for the participant is between 20%-25%.5 If Option A is chosen for all 
10 tasks, it indicates a highly impatient participant who has a discount rate higher than 50%, 
because the £250 principle is still chosen even when the future reward is larger than the principle 
by a 50% interest rate. Similarly, another extreme case is when Option B is chosen for all tasks, 
which indicates a discount rate below 5%. 
2.2 Risk preference MPLs 
Similar to the time preference MPL, the risk preference MPL (see Appendix Table 2) also has 
two options A and B. Each of the two options gives two alternative rewards, e.g. £140 and £80 
                                               
3  The £250 principle is comparable to the amount used in other developed societies, for instance Denmark 
(Andersen et al., 2014). 
4 The one-month front-end delay indicates a one-month delay on both the early and late payments to control for 
the transaction costs possibly associated with future payments, such as the credibility of being paid (Andersen et 
al., 2008). 
5 Another method to elicit time preference estimates is to calculate the mean of the six discount rates inferred from 
the switching points in the six MPLs (Ikeda et al., 2010). However, this method suffers from an upward-bias 
because it assumes neutral risk preference which is often violated (Andersen et al., 2008). 
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(Option A) and £200 and £20 (Option B). The probabilities of getting the A or B rewards are 
identical in both options. Option A in choice task 1 gives a 10% chance of receiving £140 and 
90% chance of receiving £80 while Option B has a 10% chance of getting a significantly higher 
amount (£200) and 90% of getting a much lower amount (£20). Thus, Option A is a “safe” 
option since the least possible reward is £80, as compared to “risky” Option B where there is a 
small chance of getting £200 but a large chance of getting only £20. As the participant moves 
down from one task to the next, the chance of receiving the larger (lower) amounts in both 
lotteries increases (decreases) by 10%. In other words, Option B gradually becomes a “safer” 
choice as the tasks progress down. The “safeness” of Option B as opposed to Option A is 
manifested by the differences between the expected values of the two options, which are 
negative in the first 4 tasks, 0 in the fifth task, and positive in tasks 6-10. Again the switching 
point determines an individual’s risk preference. A risk-loving participant would switch before 
the fifth task and risk for the higher reward (£200), despite the expected value of Option B for 
the first four tasks being lower than that of Option A. A risk-averse participant would switch 
after the fifth task, although Option B (compared to those after the fifth) has a higher expected 
value, to avoid the possibility (despite small) of getting a lower reward of £20. A risk neutral 
decision-maker will switch at choice task 5. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Econometric framework 
We turn to the methodology of eliciting time and risk preferences based on the MPLs described 
in Section 2. Following Andersen et al. (2008) and the literature thereafter, we control for a 
concave utility function, since the failure to comply leads to upward-biased discount rate 
estimates. We also control for probability weighting which is frequently neglected which refers 
to the phenomenon that individuals tend to make decisions under uncertainty based on objective 
rather than subjective probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Put differently, people often 
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form differentiated objective or personal probabilities when presented with the same physical 
probabilities. Not controlling for probability weighting has resulted in different discount rate 
estimates (Laury, McInnes, & Swarthout, 2012). Furthermore, to understand which discount 
functional form better describes the data, we estimate mixture models which provide a robust 
and reliable classification of individuals into one functional form against its alternatives. 
Greater details on the specification of the econometric framework are provided in Appendix 3. 
3.2 Time preference functional forms 
We do not intend to consider all existing functional forms in the time preference literature6, but 
instead to include only the most prominent functional forms listed in Andersen et al. (2014). 
We consider two sole-parameter specifications (Exponential and Mazur) and three dual-
parameter specifications (Weibull, Quasi-hyperbolic, and General-hyperbolic), where the 
former quantifies the level of impatience by its sole-parameter, and the latter accommodates 
the two facets of time preference, namely impatience (the magnitude of a general discount rate) 
and time-inconsistency (the trend that discount rate decreases with time). The two facets are 
independent so that highly impatient individuals may have either time-consistent or -
inconsistent discounting. As we will show later, disentangling the two should help us to devise 
incentive strategies that fit the discounting patterns of a target population. 
Samuelson’s (1938) Exponential specification has a constant discount rate which is defined as 
follows: 
                                                                  ܦܴ(ா) = ߜா                                                       (1) 
where ߜா represents the Exponential discount rate which is constant over time. Its discount 
factor ܦܨ(ா) equals 1/(1 + ߜா)௧. 
Mazur’s (1984) functional form assumes that the discount rate is: 
                                                           ܦܴ(ெ) = (1 + ߜ௄ݐ)ଵ/௧ − 1                                      (2) 
                                               
6 For a survey of functional forms see Abdellaoui et al. (2010) and Rohde (2010). 
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where t indicates time horizon and ߜ௄ is a parameter to be estimated. Similar to Exponential, 
the discount factor for Mazur is ܦܨ(ெ) = 1/(1+ߜ௄ݐ). 
Read’s (2001) Weibull specification has discount rates represented as: 
                                                          ܦܴ(ௐ஻) = ݁ݔ݌ (ߜௐ஻ݐ(ଵିఉ
ೈಳ)/ఉೈಳ) − 1                 (3) 
where t is time horizon, ߜௐ஻ a parameter determining the level of discount rate, and ߚௐ஻ an 
indicator of a declining discount rate over time. Transforming (3), Weibull’s discount factor is 
obtained: ܦܨ(ௐ஻) = ݁ݔ݌(−ߜௐ஻ݐଵ/ఉ
ೈಳ ) . If ߚௐ஻  is close to 1, ܦܨ(ௐ஻)  collapses to 
exp (−ߜௐ஻ݐ), the exponential discounting form. If ߚௐ஻ is larger than 1, it takes the shape of a 
hyperbolic function.  
Next, the discount rates for Laibson’s (1997) Quasi-hyperbolic specification are defined as: 
                                                         ܦܴ(ொு) = [ߚொு/(1 + ߜொு)௧]ିଵ/௧ − 1                       (4) 
with a discount factor of [ߚொு/(1 + ߜொு)௧] where ߚொு is an indicator for time-inconsistency 
and ߜொு the level of long-term discount rates. ߚொு < 1 implies time-inconsistent discounting 
whereas ߚொு = 1 indicates exponential discounting. 
Finally, Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) General-hyperbolic specification has its discount 
rates defined as: 
                                                          ܦܴ(ீு) = (1 + ߚீுݐ)
ഃಸಹ
ഁಸಹ೟ − 1                                 (5) 
where ߜீு and ߚீு determine the level of discount rate and the extent of time-inconsistency, 
respectively. The implied discounting factor for this specification is ܦܨ(ீு) = 1/(1 +
ߚீுݐ)
ഃಸಹ
ഁಸಹ. If ߚீு is close to 1, Eq. (5) collapses to the exponential discount function. If ߚீு>1, 
the discount rates decrease over time. The magnitude of ߚீு  determines the speed of the 
declining trend. One should note that ߜ and ߚ are independent so that impatient individuals 
(high ߜ) may display either time-consistent or time-inconsistent discounting.  
11 
 
The estimations followed a three-step procedure. First, the five discount factor specifications 
(ܦܨ(ா), ܦܨ(ெ), ܦܨ(ௐ஻) , ܦܨ(ொு)  and ܦܨ(ீு)) were individually inserted into the econometric 
framework described in Appendix 3 to estimate their corresponding shape parameters. Next, 
four mixture models (General-hyperbolic versus Exponential; General-hyperbolic versus 
Mazur; General-hyperbolic versus Weibull; General-hyperbolic versus Quasi-hyperbolic) were 
estimated to discover the probabilities that choices belong to two alternative functional forms. 
Finally, the shape parameters from the five discounting models were allowed to be 
heterogeneous across smoking status within the same maximum likelihood estimation 
framework to estimate the marginal effects of smoking status on the shape parameters. All 
models control for risk preference, probability weighting and background consumption. 
4 Sample 
The field experiments were conducted in February 2013 in Belfast, Northern Ireland, as a part 
of the Physical Activity Loyalty (PAL) card scheme (for a detailed description of the scheme 
see (Hunter, Tully, Davis, Stevenson, & Kee, 2013) which aimed at increasing workplace 
physical activity. 176 office-based civil servants took part in the experiments by responding to 
invitation emails which were sent to them via their internal network at work. Participants were 
randomised into groups of between 10 and 18. Prior to the experiments, the participants were 
informed that there was a 10% chance of getting their chosen rewards paid for real, 
independently for the discounting and risk tasks. Whether a participant received a reward from 
the discounting tasks was decided by rolling a 10-sided die, with the prize rewarded when 
number 1 was rolled. A 6-sided die and 10-sided die were then rolled to determine the number 
of the choice task and the question number to be paid. Participants’ answers to that particular 
choice task determined the reward which was paid on the chosen date of payment. The payment 
for the risk preference task followed a separate and similar procedure where a 10-sided die was 
rolled to determine whether a reward from the risk preference task was to be received, and, if 
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number 1 was rolled, another throw of a 10-sided die determined the number of the task to be 
played for real money. Each participant completed sixty time preference and ten risk preference 
choice tasks, amounting to 12,320 choices. 
5 Empirical findings 
5.1 Descriptions of choices 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of choices from the discounting tasks with and without a FED. 
Each participant completed six time preference MPLs, amounting to a total of 1056. Among 
them, 93% had no multiple switches (switch from Option A to Option B then switch back to 
Option A), suggesting that a majority of the participants understood the tasks well 7. Among the 
choices without multiple switches, only 3% were “never-switched” choices, i.e. Option A was 
selected for all 10 tasks, indicating that the upper-limit (50%) discount rate “covers” the 
discount rates of a majority of participants, irrespective of time horizons. Figure 1 shows that 
the proportion of participants choosing Option B (future payment) increases with the amount 
of future rewards. Imposing an FED did not lead to a different share of participants opting for 
Option B. This is surprising and contrasts with the results reported by Andersen et al. (2014). 
A possible explanation is that credibility of receiving future payments was guaranteed in this 
study so that the transaction costs associated with future payments were minimal. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
5.2 Probability weighting 
Table 1 shows the maximum likelihood estimations individually for the five discount functions 
while controlling for risk preference, background consumption and probability weighting. We 
                                               
7 Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) suggested enforcing monotonic switching by asking participants at which 
question they would like to switch. However, we did not follow this because “forcing” participants to switch may 
change their discount rates. 
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first discuss risk preference ݎ  and probability weighting parameters ߟ  and ߮ . The risk 
preference parameter ݎ is estimated to be significantly different from zero in four of the five 
models: 0.57 (Exponential), 0.67 (Weibull), 0.60 (Quasi-hyperbolic) and 0.71 (General-
hyperbolic)8, which is in line with our expectation of a concave utility function. These figures 
are close to that of the Danish population (0.65, Andersen et al., 2014., page 22). ߮  has 
estimations significantly larger than 1 in all five models (2.48, Exponential; 2.45, Mazur; 2.47, 
Weibull; 2.48, Quasi-hyperbolic; 2.46, General-hyperbolic) 9 , suggesting an S-shaped 
probability weighting function. The threshold probability is approximately 40%, below (above) 
which the probabilities are under-weighted (over-weighted). The estimation of ߟ varies from 
0.73 (Mazur) to 1.10 (General-hyperbolic). Figure 2 displays the implied S-shaped probability 
weighting functions for the five models. It can be observed that the shape of probability 
weighting function is robust across models. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
5.3 Exponential or hyperbolic discounting? 
We first examine whether participants displayed exponential or hyperbolic discounting by 
observing the parameters describing time-inconsistency. The Weibull model aligns with 
hyperbolic discounting: the estimate of ߚௐ஻ (1.29) is significantly larger than 1 (p<0.01). Its 
impatience parameter ߜௐ is 0.14, which is significantly different from 0 (p<0.01). Likewise, 
the ߚீு  parameter from the General-hyperbolic model is estimated to be  3.25 and is 
                                               
8 The Mazur model gives an estimate of 0.26 (p=0.12). 
9 A test for the null hypothesis ߮=1 is rejected at the 1% significance level for all five models. 
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significantly larger than 1 (p<0.01), also indicating time-inconsistent discounting. Additionally, 
the General-hyperbolic discounting factor  ߜீு  has an estimate of 0.25. Again, the Quasi-
hyperbolic model reveals an estimate of 0.993 for the time-inconsistency coefficient ߚொு , 
which differs from 1, that would signify a constant discount rate (ߚொு=1 rejected, p<0.01). 
Figure 3 shows the predicted hyperbolic discount rates over time. The Exponential discount 
rates are time-invariant at 0.20. Relatively high discount rates implied by Mazur are observed: 
31.1% for a 1-month horizon with only a small decrease to 27.5% for a 1-year horizon. 
Conversely, the General-hyperbolic discount rates show a smooth decline from 0.28 (1-week 
horizon) to 0.25 (1-month horizon), then to 0.20 (3-month horizon), and further to 0.12 for a 1-
year horizon. Weibull discount rates have a deeper decline within the 1-month horizon, followed 
by decreases at a slower pace after that period. Similarly, the Quasi-hyperbolic rates show a 
rapid fall for short delay periods (30 days) but become smooth afterwards. The annualized 
discount rates are relatively high and indicate higher impatience compared to other populations, 
such as the Danish with a discount rate of 0.1 (Andersen et al., 2014).  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
5.4 Weibull, Quasi-hyperbolic, or General-hyperbolic? 
It is shown in Section 5.3 that discount rates decrease with time by assuming one discount 
function. However, it is unclear which of the three specifications that permit time-inconsistency 
better describes the data and how robust the estimated discount rates are across different 
specifications. Goodness-of-fit assessment using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) reveals 
that General-hyperbolic (AIC=12793.3) has the best model fit, followed by Weibull (12857.56), 
Quasi-hyperbolic (12958.72), Mazur (12983.18), and Exponential (13033.66). Additionally, 
the noise parameter ߤ஽ under General-hyperbolic is estimated to be 0.17, which is the smallest 
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among all candidate functional forms: Exponential (0.38), Mazur (2.18), Weibull (0.22), and 
Quasi-Hyperbolic (0.22). This indicates that a better characterisation of a functional form for 
intertemporal choices suggests that fewer of these choices need be categorised as stochastic 
errors. Further, to explore the extent to which the five functional forms explain intertemporal 
preferences, we present in Table 2 a probabilistic characterization by estimating the following 
four mixture models: (General-hyperbolic vs. Exponential), and (General-hyperbolic vs. 
Mazur), (General-hyperbolic vs. Weibull) and (General-hyperbolic vs. Quasi-hyperbolic).  
The mixture probability for General-hyperbolic, ߨ(General-hyperbolic), is 0.84 versus 0.16 for 
Exponential, suggesting that if Exponential was assumed to be the sole data generating process, 
the estimated discount rate would have been distorted for 84% of the choices. Instead, when 
both specifications are assumed, the choices of 84% of the subjects exhibit significant 
deviations from constant discounting. ߜா, ߜீுand ߚீு were estimated to be 0.17, 0.32 and 4.48, 
respectively, based on which the General-hyperbolic and Exponential discount rates across 
time horizons are predicted and shown in Appendix 4. It can be seen that hyperbolic discounters 
have higher discount rates than exponential discounters within the first 198 days. In a similar 
vein, General-hyperbolic is also found to have better quantitative representativeness than 
Mazur, since the individuals are assigned to General-hyperbolic with a probability of 76% and 
the remaining 24% allocated to Mazur. Furthermore, the mixture model of General-hyperbolic 
and Weibull shows that 77% choices can be characterized by General-hyperbolic (ߜீு=0.30; 
ߚீு =3.50) and the rest 23% by Weibull ( ߜௐ஻ =0.14; ߚௐ஻ =1.29). Finally, the General-
hyperbolic vs. Quasi-hyperbolic mixture model shows that 81% choices are attributed to 
General-hyperbolic and 19% to the Quasi-hyperbolic specification. It can be concluded that 
General-hyperbolic performs the best among the five specifications. Appendix 5 shows 
substantial discrepancies of discount rates for delayed time horizons between General-
hyperbolic and the other superior-fit functional forms. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5.5 Robustness to consumption smoothing, linear utility, and re-weighting 
We now test whether our results implied in the mixture models would significantly change by 
altering three model settings. First, we allow consumption smoothing i.e. the prizes are 
consumed throughout the week following receipt, differing from the earlier where recipients 
are assumed to have consumed their cash prizes in one day. Second, we examine whether our 
results are robust to the assumption of linear utility. Third, given the fact that the number of 
time preference tasks is four times greater than the risk preference tasks, as an extra robustness 
check we re-weighted numerically the responses to the risk aversion tasks relative to the number 
of time preference tasks. The results for the three robustness checks are reported in Table 3. It 
can be seen that the probabilities for discounting behaviours characterised by General-
hyperbolic against Exponential are robust under the risk-neutrality assumption (0.83) and re-
weighting of risk preference tasks (0.83), although the figure (0.68) is lower when a week-long 
consumption period is assumed. Next, the General-hyperbolic vs. Mazur and General-
hyperbolic vs. Weibull mixture models again suggested a substantial fraction (>0.72) of the 
subjects actually behaved according to General-hyperbolic as opposed to Mazur or Weibull 
(only minor differences in probabilities were found across models). Finally, the robustness 
checks for the models mixing General-hyperbolic and Quasi-hyperbolic also led to a preference 
for the former over the latter (the share of observed choices characterised by the former varied 
from 0.67 to 0.81). We thus conclude that the main findings drawn in Section 5.4 are robust to 
these modelling and specification choices. 
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
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5.6 Allowing for heterogeneity of time preference across smoking status 
Table 4 compares results from the five models when shape parameters are allowed to be 
heterogeneous across smoking status within the same maximum likelihood estimation 
framework. We use self-reported smoking status which is usually associated with high 
magnitude of impatience (Cawley & Price, 2013; Harrison et al., 2010; Ikeda et al., 2010; 
Khwaja, Silverman, & Sloan, 2007). The prevalence of current-smokers, ex-smokers, and 
never-smokers in the sample were 16.5%, 12.5% and 71.0%, respectively, consistent with the 
census data in Northern Ireland. When General-hyperbolic is assumed, the marginal effect of 
ߜீு  (0.09, p<0.10) for Smokers is positive and significant, suggesting that smokers have 
generally higher discount rates than never-smokers. However, the marginal effects of Smokers 
on ߜ parameters become smaller and less significant under Exponential (0.04, p=0.15), Mazur 
(0.05, p=0.14), Weibull (0.02, p=0.26), and Quasi-hyperbolic (0.03, p=0.25). Likewise, 
compared to Never-smokers, Ex-smokers has significantly higher ߜ  parameters assuming 
Exponential (0.05, p=0.06), Mazur (0.06, p=0.07), Weibull (0.03, p=0.07), and Quasi-
hyperbolic (0.05, p=0.04), whereas the influence on ߜீு , the best-fit specification, is less 
significant (0.04, p=0.38). Thus, we conjecture that the failure to adopt an appropriate type of 
discount functional form may lead to significantly different estimates of discount rates and 
misleading associations between time preference and real-world behaviours. Next, the shape 
parameters (ߚௐ, ߚொு , ߚீு) determining the time-inconsistency component of discounting do not 
seem to play much of a role: none of the marginal effects of Smokers and Ex-smokers are 
significant in any of the five models. This finding is in line with Harrison et al. (2017) who 
found that smoking status was not associated with the time-inconsistency of discount rates 
measured by similar incentivized experiments. Contradictory results are reported in Kang and 
Ikeda (2016) based on hypothetical time preference tasks while not controlling for risk 
preference. We conjecture that their conclusion may not hold under an incentivised and 
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structured experimental setting like ours while correcting for concavity of utility function and 
controlling for other confounding factors, i.e. probability weighting and background 
consumption.  
Due to these differentiated marginal effects of smoking status on the shape parameters, current-
smokers, ex-smokers, and never-smokers manifested differentiated discount rates (shapes) 
when a different discounting specification is assumed (see Figure 4). Appendix 6-8 reports the 
differentiation of discount rates over time between General-hyperbolic and the poor-fit 
alternative specifications, respectively for current-smokers, ex-smokers, and never-smokers. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
5.5.3 Risk preference, probability weighting and unhealthy behaviours 
We turn to the discussion of the association between smoking status and risk preference and 
subjective probability weighting. Ex-smokers has a negative and significant marginal effect on 
risk preference ݎ, indicating that Ex-smokers are more risk-loving than Never-smokers. This 
trend is robust across models assuming different functional forms. On the contrary, Smokers 
exerts an insignificant effect on ݎ, although with the expected negative signs. Additionally, Ex-
smokers has a positive and significant effect on ߟ, suggesting that Ex-smokers are more likely 
to over-weight large probabilities and under-weight smaller probabilities. Finally, we found no 
significant effect of smoking status, irrespective of the discounting specifications, on the 
probability weighting parameter ߮, suggesting that Smokers and Ex-smokers do not necessarily 
have different subjective probabilities than their Never-smokers counterparts.  
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
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The paper identifies the discount functional form which, probabilistically, has the best fit to 
discounting behaviours, based on economic experiments with real-payments conducted on a 
sample of 176 civil servants from Belfast, Northern Ireland. The experiments were composed 
of a series of multiple price lists to elicit time and risk preferences which were simultaneously 
estimated by a maximum likelihood method. A major contribution of this study is that it 
provides an empirical framework not only to parametrically discriminate between exponential 
and hyperbolic discounting, but also between three popular hyperbolic discounting 
specifications, namely Weibull, Quasi-hyperbolic and General-hyperbolic while controlling for 
risk preference, background consumption and probability weighting. The main implications are 
as follows. 
First, the predicted shape parameters of the three dual-parameter specifications (Weibull, Quasi-
hyperbolic and General-hyperbolic) unexceptionally indicate that hyperbolic discounting 
displayed descriptive superiority over exponential discounting in explaining the intertemporal 
choices made by participants, suggesting that the relative discount rate between two proximal 
dates is higher than the relative discount rate between two distal dates with the same length of 
delay. The fact that the dual-parameter discounting forms have superior fit over the sole-
parameter functional forms accords with recent neuroeconomics theory, i.e. that there are 
competing neurobehavioral decision systems (CNDS) (Bickel et al., 2007; McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004), and that two distinct brain regions are involved in the 
discounting of delayed rewards, with one region associated with time-inconsistency (known as 
the impulsive decision system) and the other related to long-run discount rate (the executive 
decision system). According to CNDS theory, these decision systems are mutable under 
environmental manipulations, making time preference a fruitful target for intervention. The 
decomposition of time preference into its two components indicates that incentive strategies 
derived from each of the two elements differ such that discount rate determines the overall level 
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of incentives whereas the time-inconsistency factor determines rewards immediacy. Discount 
rates were estimated to be approximately 0.25, which is higher than that of the Danish 
population (0.1). In the context of incentivised interventions encouraging health behaviors, the 
relatively high level of impatience suggests that a higher level of incentives is necessary for 
behavioural change. In addition, the results on time-inconsistency indicate that, for 
interventions where incentives have to be paid out when targets are met in the future, e.g. 
commitment contracts for smoking cessation, contracts that are shorter than 198 days will be 
more effective in getting exponential discounters started on the path to behaviour change than 
hyperbolic discounters who may require higher incentives during this period. Since hyperbolic 
discounters will almost certainly require higher initial incentives than exponential discounters 
to initiate behaviour change, possibilities may exist for designing novel commitment contracts 
which take advantage of the lower long-term discount rates of hyperbolic discounters, offering 
substantial and shorter term interim incentives or short-term penalties to initiate behaviour 
change coupled with smaller and long-term incentives to maintain compliance. Relatively little 
is known experimentally about how hyperbolic and exponential discounters will discount short 
and longer term financial penalties and whether novel instruments could be designed to make 
use of financial penalties as well as incentives in health policy.  
Second, a further investigation of four mixture models indicates that General-hyperbolic has 
the best fit to our empirical data, a conclusion which is in contrast with existing practices that 
predominantly assume Mazur or Quasi-hyperbolic functional forms. The discrimination among 
the hyperbolic discounting forms may be a useful tool in the interpretation of the effects of 
future interventions that either expose an individual to certain conditioned stimuli (e.g. financial 
incentives provided in commitment contracts) or that alter discounting-associated unhealthy 
behaviours. Any delay in incentive payments will decrease their effectiveness, and more so if 
a target population shows time-inconsistent discounting (Madrian, 2014). In this sense, the 
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timing of proximate incentive payments should be tailored such that more immediate rewards 
should be provided to the target population with a higher degree of time-inconsistency. This 
demonstrates the advantage of seeking the best-fit discounting form because each of the 
functional forms indicates a differentiated degree of time-inconsistency. For instance, the 
Generalised-hyperbolic functional form is indicative of a modest decrease of discounting rate 
over imminent delays, in contrast with Quasi-hyperbolic discounting which indicates a sharp 
decrease. Furthermore, we also found that the failure to adopt the best-fit functional form lead 
to significantly different discount rates and misleading associations between time preference 
and smoking status. Researchers should justify their choices of the functional form which fits 
the data best before any inferences can be made.  
In general, these conclusions are pertinent when it comes to designing financial incentives for 
stimulating behaviour change which is becoming increasingly popular among policy makers, 
particularly because the evidence for the effectiveness of financial incentives is mixed. Critics 
argue that financial incentives are crowding out of intrinsic motivation so that they may 
stimulate behaviour change in the short run but incentivized individuals tend to relapse to old 
unhealthy behaviours once the incentives are removed, whereas supporters believe that 
financial incentives assist habit formation (Charness & Gneezy, 2009). In fact, the 
ineffectiveness of financial incentives may be partly attributed to the failure to have an optimum 
level of incentive, which we argue should be devised based on the level of impatience and time-
inconsistency of the interested samples. One should note, however, that incentivized real-stake 
experiments are preferable as they offer the potential to deal better with hypothetical bias. In 
addition, some other instruments, such as contingent valuation, which is a useful tool to elicit 
willingness to accept financial incentives for behavioural change, should be coupled with 
discount rate analysis, to develop the optimum level of incentives for intervention programs.  
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Further, our participants were found to have under-weighted small probabilities and had over-
weighted large probabilities, which casts light on the fact that that some people may continue 
their unhealthy behaviours perhaps because they are “optimistic” about not developing a low 
probability disease. Although smokers did not display a different probability weighting function 
in our study, future studies should extend this analysis and investigate how the probability 
weighting phenomenon helps understand the mechanism by which people perceive rare health 
events. For example, in the context of smoking cessation, they may have an improper 
understanding of their cancer risk (in fact, although the risk is lower after quitting, smokers 
carry a higher risk than non-smokers for years). Health promotion programmes may need to 
make smokers more aware of the real probabilities of illness attendant on their habit. On the 
other hand, smokers are likely to underestimate the probability (to be pessimistic) of reaping 
likely future health benefits (if they were to quit). 
A possible drawback of our study is that it does not take into account the functions 
accommodating increasing impatience, which is another type of violation of constant 
discounting worthy more attention (Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2013). More 
empirical evidence in this regard is needed as is research to shed light on the public health 
implications of tailoring intervention to individuals characterised by increasing patience. One 
should also note that even the best-fit functional form, i.e. General-hyperbolic, does not capture 
a complete picture of discounting behaviours. Instead, a fraction of intertemporal choices, 
though small, can still be fitted to other functional forms. Thus, another previously overlooked 
area, but nonetheless an important methodological issue, is the use of a non-parametric method, 
known as Area Under the Curve (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001) which sums the 
areas of the trapezoids formed by plotting successive future delays and their associated discount 
rates inferred by observing indifference points. New avenues are open for future research to 
compare the performance of parametric and non-parametric methods. Additionally, our study 
23 
 
used a cross-sectional dataset which does not allow us to test how time preference interacts with 
the change of smoking behaviour in a dynamic way. It is also unclear how behavioural change 
will respond to incentive levels developed by time preference analysis. Future studies should 
target these areas. 
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Table 1 Estimated shape parameters assuming an individual functional form 
 Sole-parameter functional forms  Dual-parameter functional forms 
 Exponential  Mazur  Weibull  Quasi-hyperbolic  General-hyperbolic 
 Estimates p-values  Estimates 
p-
values  Estimates 
p-
values  Estimates 
p-
values  Estimates 
p-
values 
ߜா 0.20(0.03)*** 0.00             
ߜெ    0.27(0.05)*** 0.00          
ߜௐ஻       0.14(0.02)*** 0.00       
ߚௐ஻        1.29(0.04)*** 0.00       
ߜொு          0.18(0.03)*** 0.00    
ߚொு          0.993(0.002)*** 0.00    
ߜீு             0.25(0.05)*** 0.00 
ߚீு             3.25(0.57)*** 0.00 
ݎ 0.57(0.13)*** 0.00  0.26(0.16) 0.12  0.67(0.14)*** 0.00  0.60(0.13)*** 0.00  0.71(0.15)*** 0.00 
ߟ 0.97(0.11)*** 0.00  0.73(0.12)*** 0.00  1.06(0.12)*** 0.00  1.00(0.12)*** 0.00  1.10(0.13)*** 0.00 
߮ 2.48(0.31)*** 0.00  2.45(0.34)*** 0.00  2.47(0.31)*** 0.00  2.48(0.31)*** 0.00  2.46(0.31)*** 0.00 
               
ߤ஽ 0.38(0.27) 0.17  2.18(1.97) 0.27  0.22(0.17) 0.20  0.31(0.23) 0.18  0.17(0.14) 0.22 
ߤோ 0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.17(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00 
               
No. observations 12320   12320   12320   12320   12320  
No. subjects  176   176   176   176   176  
No. parameters 6   6   7   7   7  
AIC 13033.66   12983.18   12857.56   12958.72   12793.30  
Log-likelihood -6510.83   -6485.59   -6421.78   -6472.36   -6389.65  
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 2 Estimated shape parameters in the mixture models 
 General-hyperbolic vs. 
Exponential 
 General-hyperbolic vs. Mazur  General-hyperbolic vs. 
Weibull 
 General-hyperbolic vs. Quasi-
hyperbolic 
 Estimates p-values  Estimates p-values  Estimates p-values  Estimates p-values 
ߜீு 0.32(0.06)*** 0.00  0.28(0.05)*** 0.00  0.30(0.05)*** 0.00  0.31(0.06)*** 0.00 
ߚீு  4.48(0.72)*** 0.00  3.91(0.74)*** 0.00  3.50(0.71)*** 0.00  4.34(0.74)*** 0.00 
ߜா 0.17(0.03)*** 0.00          
ߜெ    0.37(0.05)*** 0.00       
ߜௐ஻       0.13(0.02)*** 0.00    
ߚௐ஻        1.29(0.04)*** 0.00    
ߜொு          0.34(0.06)*** 0.00 
ߚொு          0.998(0.003)*** 0.00 
            
ݎ 0.64(0.13)*** 0.00  0.48(0.12)*** 0.00  0.63(0.13)*** 0.00  0.65(0.13)*** 0.00 
ߟ 1.04(0.12)*** 0.00  0.90(0.11)*** 0.00  1.03(0.12)*** 0.00  1.04(0.11)*** 0.00 
߮ 2.47(0.31)*** 0.00  2.48(0.31)*** 0.00  2.48(0.31)*** 0.00  2.47(0.31)*** 0.00 
            
π(General-hyperbolic) 0.84(0.04)*** 0.00  0.76(0.03)*** 0.00  0.77(0.06)*** 0.00  0.81(0.07)*** 0.00 
π(Exponential) 0.16(0.04)*** 0.00          
π(Mazur)    0.24(0.03)*** 0.00       
π(Weibull)       0.23(0.06)*** 0.00    
π(Quasi-hyperbolic)          0.19(0.07)*** 0.01 
ߤ஽ଵ 0.29(0.21) 0.24  0.43(0.28) 0.13  0.34(0.25) 0.18  0.29(0.22) 0.18 
ߤ஽ଶ 0.02(0.02) 0.17  0.11(0.07) 0.11  0.04(0.03) 0.27  0.03(0.03) 0.36 
ߤோ 0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00 
No. observations 12320   12320   12320   12320  
No. subjects 176   176   176   176  
No. parameters 11   11   12   12  
Log-likelihood -6366.09   -6274.97   -6353.64   -6365.00  
Note: Coefficients are marginal effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 3 Robustness checks 
Parameter Assuming risk 
neutrality 
Days over which 
subjects spend earnings 
(days=7) 
Re-weighting 
responses to the 
risk tasks 
General-hyperbolic vs. Exponential 
π(General-hyperbolic) 0.83 (0.04) 0.68 (0.13) 0.83 (0.04) 
π(Exponential) 0.17 (0.04) 0.32 (0.13) 0.17 (0.04) 
    
General-hyperbolic vs. Mazur   
π(General-hyperbolic) 0.79 (0.06) 0.76 (0.03) 0.76 (0.03) 
π(Mazur) 0.21 (0.06) 0.24 (0.03) 0.24 (0.03) 
    
    
General-hyperbolic vs. Weibull 
π(General-hyperbolic) 0.76 (0.05) 0.72 (0.08) 0.77 (0.06) 
π(Weibull) 0.24 (0.05) 0.28 (0.08) 0.23 (0.06) 
    
General-hyperbolic vs. Quasi-hyperbolic 
π(General-hyperbolic) 0.67 (0.08) 0.81 (0.03) 0.81 (0.07) 
π(Quasi-hyperbolic) 0.33 (0.08) 0.19 (0.03) 0.19 (0.07) 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. To save space, the estimates 
for the other shape parameters and the error terms are not reported here but are available upon request. 
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Table 4 Estimates of the effects of smoking status on shape parameters 
 Sole-parameter functional forms  Dual-parameter functional forms 
 Exponential  Mazur  Weibull  Quasi-hyperbolic  General-hyperbolic 
 Coefficients p-
values 
 Coefficients p-
values 
 Coefficients p-
values 
 Coefficients p-
values 
 Coefficients p-
values 
Parameters ߜா   ߜெ   ߜௐ஻   ߜொு   ߜீு  
Smokers 0.04(0.03) 0.15  0.05(0.03) 0.14  0.02(0.02) 0.26  0.03(0.03) 0.25  0.09(0.05)* 0.09 
Ex-smokers 0.05(0.03)* 0.06  0.06(0.03)* 0.07  0.03(0.02)** 0.07  0.05(0.03)** 0.04  0.04(0.04) 0.38 
Constant 0.20(0.03)*** 0.00  0.28(0.05)*** 0.00  0.19(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.03)*** 0.00  0.24(0.05)*** 0.00 
               
Parameters       ߚௐ஻   ߚொு   ߚீு  
Smokers --- ---  --- ---  0.09(0.12) 0.43  -0.003(0.004) 0.43  1.44(1.65) 0.38 
Ex-smokers --- ---  --- ---  -0.07(0.09) 0.47  -0.004(0.004) 0.31  -0.36(1.17) 0.76 
Constant --- ---  --- ---  1.30(0.05)*** 0.00  0.993(0.002)*** 0.00  3.046(0.735)*** 0.00 
               
Parameters ݎ   ݎ   ݎ   ݎ   ݎ  
Smokers -0.03(0.03) 0.31  -0.03(0.03) 0.27  -0.03(0.03) 0.27  -0.03(0.03) 0.31  -0.03(0.03) 0.24 
Ex-smokers -0.07(0.03)** 0.04  -0.07(0.03)** 0.04  -0.07(0.04)** 0.05  -0.07(0.03)** 0.05  -0.07(0.04)** 0.05 
Constant 0.55(0.13)*** 0.00  0.21(0.17)** 0.03  0.65(0.14)*** 0.00  0.58(0.13)*** 0.00  0.69(0.14)*** 0.00 
               
Parameters ߟ   ߟ   ߟ   ߟ   ߟ  
Smokers 0.19(0.31) 0.54  0.13(0.22) 0.54  0.21(0.34) 0.55  0.20(0.32) 0.54  0.21(0.36) 0.55 
Ex-smokers 0.58(0.33)* 0.08  0.49(0.27)* 0.07  0.60(0.35)* 0.08  0.59(0.33)* 0.08  0.61(0.36)* 0.09 
Constant 0.86(0.12)*** 0.00  0.63(0.11)*** 0.00  0.93(0.13)*** 0.00  0.88(0.12)*** 0.00  0.97(0.13)*** 0.00 
               
Parameters ߮   ߮   ߮   ߮   ߮  
Smokers -0.38(0.61) 0.53  -0.36(0.59) 0.55  -0.36(0.62) 0.56  -0.37(0.61) 0.54  -0.35(0.63) 0.58 
Ex-smokers 0.77(1.45) 0.77  1.44(2.29) 0.53  0.64(1.31) 0.63  0.72(1.39) 0.61  0.589(1.25) 0.64 
Constant 2.47(0.36)*** 0.00  2.41(0.46)*** 0.00  2.46(0.35)*** 0.00  2.47(0.35)*** 0.00  2.45(0.35)*** 0.00 
               
ߤ஽ 0.45(0.32) 0.16  2.97(2.76) 0.28  0.26(0.20) 0.19  0.37(0.27) 0.17  0.20(0.16) 0.21 
ߤோ 0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.17(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.08)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00  0.18(0.02)*** 0.00 
No. observations 12320   12320   12320   12320   12320  
No. subjects 176   176   176   176   176  
No. parameters 14   14   17   17   17  
Log-likelihood -6466.34   -6438.27   -6373.45   -6426.46   -6338.07  
Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
32 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated discount rates over time 
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